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The Payment Services Directive was intended to provide more price transparency for users and 
a level playing field for efficient competition among different payment services by decreasing the 
inhibiting effects of different legislation, cross-subsidisation and non-cost-based pricing. The 
European Commission, however, intended most of these effects to come about through market-
led initiatives. In the run-up to the review of the Directive, it is time to ask whether more could 
be done to promote the use of efficient payment methods. 
Introduction 
The Payment Services Directive (PSD) 2007/64/EC is aimed at fostering the internal market on payment 
services and in particular the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). Covering all electronic and non-cash 
payments in all EEA countries, the Directive provides a fully harmonised simplified set of rules with 
regard to information requirements and reinforces the rights and obligations of the users and providers of 
payment services. The role of SEPA is to provide harmonised euro payment services to be treated as 
domestic payments within the EU. Together PSD and SEPA aim to create a common legal framework and 
a standardised environment for euro payment services in the EU. 
The Directive will be reviewed in 2012. With the emergence of new market participants, new 
technologies and stronger emphasis on consumer protection, there are several issues that need special 
attention in the review process. As PSD constitutes the legal basis for the SEPA, the review should be 
considered as a possibility to correct the oversights and deficiencies currently hindering the full 
development of the SEPA. Following the financial crisis, payment-service providers need a framework 
that promotes efficiency while payment-service users need confidence in the payment systems. 
Furthermore, as banks still cover most of the world’s payment services, the Directive should also be 
assessed in the context of the regulatory turmoil that banks are currently facing. New liquidity 
requirements are likely to necessitate strategic repositioning for banks, while ring-fencing banks’ retail 
operations from the investment sector may put some of the requirements in the current PSD in a new 
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light. Maintaining a level playing field between different payment services providers may have become 
more difficult. 
In the process of designing the PSD, the Commission identified certain deficiencies in the EU payment 
services market. One of the main the issues raised was the high cost of the payment system to the 
economy due to its inefficient use, with cash being significantly more costly to the economy than 
electronic payments. A second set of deficiencies was found in EU payment infrastructures and services, 
as the systems in the EU were predominantly national, making cross-border systems small in scale and 
costly to operate. Thirdly, the Commission noted the large differences in the efficiency of payment 
services in the Single Market as well as the fragmented nature of the legal framework for payment 
services, calling for more integration and harmonisation in order to achieve a more efficient EU payment 
market.
1 
With the SEPA migration still under way, the Commission decided to leave these problem areas to the 
market forces to determine the design and success of payment schemes and the consolidation of 
infrastructures. In lieu of regulatory intervention, general principles were formulated in order to eliminate 
or minimise the barriers to making payments as easily, safely, efficiently and inexpensively across 
borders as within national borders. The Commission acknowledged that attentive monitoring of the 
effects of self-regulation would be essential, and if monitoring should confirm market failures with 
respect to pricing, costs of payment the system or technical and organisational barriers to market entry, 
actions to propose binding legislation would have to be taken.  
Now faced with reviewing the Directive, the Commission is asking whether the regulation is ideal for an 
efficient payments market. An efficient payments industry can reduce the economy’s total payment costs 
as well as ensure higher transparency and better consumer protection. Authorities have indeed recently 
begun to pay more attention to retail payments and their efficiency. It is time to assess what could be done 
to better promote the use of the most efficient payment instruments in order to facilitate the full use of the 
Single Payments Market. The reasons for this assessment include of course the SEPA, but also the 
importance of efficient payments to the world economy. 
Room for regulatory intervention? 
It is now widely acknowledged that cash payments are more costly to society than electronic payments
2. 
Still, the EU continues to incur significant costs from rising euro cash-in-circulation. Even though there 
are variations between countries, euro banknote circulation has been consistently growing at a faster pace 
than the growth in non-cash transactions. Savings can be achieved by moving from paper-based payments 
to their electronic versions and from less efficient instruments to low-cost or high-benefit instruments, for 
example from cash to cards. The recent World Payments Report 2011 estimates that if the eurozone could 
reduce cash usage, it could save approximately €20 billion per year just through the proportional 
reduction in euro cash-handling costs and also improving tax transparency. 
3 
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The key question, therefore, is how to provide a market framework that fosters efficiency of the payment 
system, especially through lowering the costs for the economy. For this purpose it is important to identify 
which factors determine the usage of different payment services. Earlier studies have shown that the two 
main factors determining the usage patterns of different payment services are price and ease of use.
4 
Consequently, in the review of the Directive, the need for changes and amendments should be considered 
through these requirements in order to facilitate the use of non-cash payment methods, which provide the 
basis for an efficient SEPA. However, there are several levels of pricing, affecting different payment 
users differently. Merchants are mainly concerned with merchant service charges, while consumers act on 
the basis of the final price of the product they are buying. Therefore, from the perspective of improving 
consumer confidence and protection, the mechanisms affecting consumer prices are in focus.  
Against this background, the option of imposing surcharges arises as an important question. If price 
transparency were to be used as an argument supporting surcharging, surcharges should be imposed on 
both electronic and cash payments. Surcharging cards and not cash effectively discriminates card 
payments against cash payments. Therefore, surcharges imposed on only card payments would discourage 
the highly promoted use of more efficient payment systems, i.e. cards, and secondly, they may provide 
merchants an opportunity to extract consumer surplus especially in e-commerce.  
Under the current Article 52(3) of the Directive, payment service providers shall not prevent the payees 
(merchants) from requesting a charge or offering the customer a reduction for the use of a given payment 
instrument, but the Member States are allowed to prohibit payees from imposing surcharges on certain 
payment instruments in order to promote competition or encourage the use of efficient payment methods. 
This option has been used in some Member States, and today Austria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden prohibit all charges. 
Limitations to charges are applied by Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark and Hungary. Therefore, at the 
moment, the field for surcharges is highly fragmented throughout the European payment markets. 
Consequently, the Commission is now assessing the practical and financial consequences of the 
application or non-application of the surcharge rule. In particular, some Member States’ decision to forbid 
surcharges and their impact on competition and efficiency is under scrutiny. The Commission is also 
interested to learn whether surcharges are actually being used as an additional source of income. 
The role of surcharges 
Pricing payment instruments is a complex matter because payment networks give rise to large economies 
of scale and various types of externalities. Generally, production costs should be the basis of efficient 
pricing of payment services, allowing the consumer to make a choice that will result in the optimal use of 
society’s resources. In certain cases, however, an adjustment for externalities is necessary, with positive 
externalities leading to prices below the production cost while negative externalities set the price above 
the production cost. One particular type of positive externality is created by network effects. Payment 
systems are generally characterised by network effects that arise when the benefit of a product to a user 
increases as the number of other users of the same product increases. In the case of cash, the network 
effects are largely direct and one-sided as it is practically accepted by all the players in the market. For 
cards, the network effect is two-sided as cardholders do not benefit from an increase in the number of 
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cardholders as merchants do, but cardholders benefit from an increase in the number of merchants who 
accept cards.
5  
The solution generally used by the payment services industry to cover its production costs has been 
subsidisation, where the market that benefits more from the system subsidises the other side. The price of 
cash and card payments are effectively hidden from consumers. Nevertheless, this type of pricing may 
lead to an overuse of less efficient payment instruments. With regards to the card payments market, this 
may result in too few payment terminals and too few customers with cards, leading to overuse of cash. 
The observation that the payments industry is a two-sided market has stressed the fact that in setting 
payment prices, banks need to get both consumers and retailers on board by pricing both sides of the 
market in an effective way. The ability of the merchant to impose a surcharge on card payments affects 
the price structure, and therefore the total demand of card payment services (Bolt et al., 2010). Rochet & 
Tirole (2002, 2003) have shown that the price structure and therefore also the interchange fee, becomes 
irrelevant if merchants charge different prices for cash and card payments. Consequently, from a 
theoretical perspective, the surcharge option neutralises the impact of interchange fees on end-user tariffs 
and it gives merchants a tool with which to influence their customers’ payment choice (Gans & King, 
2003). This argument assumes, however, that all means of payment are surcharged, including cash. 
Confronting theory with evidence 
Studies generally show that from a cost perspective, debit cards are underused
6. The question of whether 
surcharges significantly contribute to this under-usage is more difficult to answer. Empirical studies 
investigating the impact of surcharges on the usage patterns and consequently on the use of efficient 
payment methods show that surcharges steer consumers away from using debit cards towards the use of 
cash. Research by the Reserve Bank of Australia (2008) reveals that consumers use their cards less where 
surcharges are applied. Consistently, Bolt et al. (2010) show using Dutch survey data from both 
consumers and merchants, that removing debit card charges will lead to more debit card payments and 
reduce the use of cash. Therefore, imposing surcharges on card payments decreases their usage, 
increasing the costs payments to the economy. 
Although less surcharges on debit card payments is favourable for the efficiency of payment systems, 
prohibiting the ability to surcharge may also have adverse effects as merchants face higher fees for card 
payments, leading possibly to lower card acceptance. Consequently, some theoretical arguments have 
emphasised taking into account the degree of competition among merchants and network externalities 
when assessing the justification of a no-surcharge rule. However, the scale economies of card payments 
provide an important argument in favour of a no-surcharge rule. Once unit transaction costs fall due to 
scale economies, more and more merchants will save transaction costs by accepting card payments and 
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they will be more inclined to not impose surcharges (DNB, 2010). Studies have also suggested that not 
imposing a debit card surcharge may result in higher sales (Rochet & Tirole, 2002; Bolt et al., 2010). 
Therefore, accepting debit cards can be a service to the consumer and therefore increase business. When 
the average transaction cost of card payments drops below that of cash payments, card surcharges no 
longer contribute to cost-effective consumer payment behaviour. 
Furthermore, in the case of low competition, merchants only have to consider the impact of surcharges on 
the demand of their customers. Wright (2003) shows that when merchants with monopoly power are 
allowed to surcharge, they will do so excessively in order to extract consumer surplus from cardholders. 
Conclusions 
The trend towards transparent and efficient pricing calls for abolishing cross-subsidisation. Price 
competition cannot exist in a market that functions without direct charges and where new entrants have to 
rely on cross-subsidisation in order to sell their services. If the end-users do not see the costs of different 
payment methods, they have little incentive to change their behaviour towards the more efficient payment 
methods. If given the option to impose a surcharge, merchants may be encouraged to start accepting 
payment cards. However, as the competitive environment may distort the pricing choices of the merchant, 
there is a risk that surcharges may be used to extract consumer surplus. Furthermore, surcharges influence 
consumers’ perceptions of the cost of card payments and imposing a surcharge on cost-efficient means of 
payment may deter consumers from paying efficiently. Therefore, imposing surcharges on card payments 
comes with a risk of steering the pricing of payment instruments towards less transparency.  
Having the well-functioning Single Payments Market as the ultimate goal, the Commission may have to 
take a stronger role in regulating the pricing of payments. If SEPA is expected to provide all the expected 
benefits, the use of electronic payments should be promoted. The question is whether surcharges play an 
important role in the use of electronic payment methods. The evidence suggests that imposing surcharges 
on debit card payments is leading to lower usage rates of card payments. Lower usage of card payments 
would likely decrease the vital economies of scale associated with card payments. As variable costs for 
merchants would increase, it would again lead to lower acceptance of cards at points of sale. This would 
be more expensive for the economy and run counter to the objectives of the PSD, not to mention failing to 
promote technological innovation in payment services. 
The Commission should now carefully consider the pros and cons of surcharges and take into account 
their interplay with pricing structures of wider payment systems. If surcharges are to be generally 
forbidden, it limits the bargaining power of merchants vis-á-vis card companies, while allowing it hands 
merchants a tool to influence their customers’ payment choice. In the review of the Directive, however, 
one has to keep in mind the objective of higher consumer protection through enhanced user confidence 
and price transparency. Consumers are dependent on payment services, which is why consumer 
protection is a corner stone of the PSD. Changes in customers’ payment habits through payment services 
infrastructures have to be taken into account as they are the driving force behind the cost efficiencies 
achieved through economies of scale. 
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